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Introduction to

Thinking as Communication
Anna Sfard
University of Haifa, Israel and Michigan State University

If we see knowing not as having an essence, to be described by scientists
or philosophers, but rather as a right, by current standards, to believe,
then we are well on the way to seeing conversation as the ultimate
context within which knowledge is to be understood. Our focus shifts
from the relation between human beings and the objects of their inquiry
to the relation between alternative standards of justification, and from
there to the actual changes in those standards which make up intellectual
history.
Richard Rorty1
This book is a result of years-long attempts to change my own thinking about thinking, a task
seemingly as improbable as breaking a hammer by hitting it with itself. In this unlikely
undertaking, I have been inspired by Lev Vygotsky, the Byelorussian psychologist who devoted
his life to “characterizing the uniquely human aspects of behavior,”2 and by Ludwig
Wittgenstein, the Austrian-British philosopher who insisted that no substantial progress can be
made in this kind of endeavor unless the ways we talk, and thus think, about uniquely human
“forms of life” undergo extensive revisions.
My admittedly ambitious undertaking had modest beginnings. I was initially interested in
learning and teaching of mathematics. Like many others before me, I was mystified by what
could best be described as vagaries of human mind: whereas some people juggled numbers,
polygons and functions effortlessly, some others were petrified at the very mention of numbers
or geometric figures. Many of those who erred in their use of mathematical terms and
techniques, seemed to err in a systematic, surprisingly similar ways. And then, there was the
wonder of little children doing strange things with numbers before gradually becoming able to
handle them the standard way. Above all, however, one could not but puzzle over why the
persistent attempts to improve mathematics learning that have been lasting for many decades, if
not centuries, did not seem to have any sustainable effect. After years of grappling with these
and similar phenomena, I realized that one cannot crack the puzzles of mathematical thinking
without taking a good look at human thinking at large. I ended up wondering with Vygotsky
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about how the unique human abilities “have been formed in the course of history” and about
“the way they develop over an individual lifetime.”3
I soon discovered that whoever forays into this exciting territory dooms herself to an
uneasy life. The first predicament of the student of human development is her being torn
between two conflicting wishes: the wish to be scientific, whatever this word means to her, and
the desire to capture the gist of those phenomena that are unique to humans. Whenever one of
these needs is taken care of, the other one appears to be inherently unsatisfiable. Indeed, across
history, the tug-of-war between the two goals, that of scientific reproducibility, rigor and
cumulativeness, on the one hand, and that of doing justice to the complexity of the "uniquely
human," on the other, resulted in the pendulum-like movement between the reductionist and the
"gestaltist" poles. Reductionist theories, of which behaviorism is arguably the most extreme
example, can boast the scientific operationality of their vocabulary, but they eventually kill their
object by throwing some of its vital parts away. Socioculturally-minded followers of Vygotsky,
on the other hand, aware of the futility of the search conducted “under the lamp” rather than in
those dark places where answers to their questions may really be hiding, fail to communicate
their rich ideas clearly enough to give rise to well-defined programs of study.
Today, our sense of helplessness may well be at its most acute. New technologies afford
unprecedented insights into human phenomena and produce high-resolution evidence of the
utmost complexity of human forms of life. With audio- and video-recorders as standard
ingredients of the researcher’s toolkit, the fleeting human action acquires permanence and
becomes researchable in ways unknown to our predecessors. When carefully documented and
transcribed, even the most common of everyday conversations prove to be a complex,
multifaceted phenomenon, and an inexhaustible source of wonderings. This makes us as aware
as ever of the fact that our ability to analyze and explain lags behind our ability to observe and to
see. In this respect, our current situation is comparable to that of the 17th century scientists just
faced with the newly invented microscope: Powerful, high-resolution lenses that reveal what was
never noticed before are yet to be matched by an equally powerful analytic apparatus.
Inadequacies of conceptual tools are what Wittgenstein had in mind while complaining,
more than half a century ago, about the state of research on human thinking. “[T]he concepts of
psychology are just everyday concepts,” he said, whereas what we need are “concepts newly
fashioned by science for its own purpose.”4 These words seem as much in force today as they
were when originally written. Lacking a designated, operationally defined vocabulary, the study of
humans remains plagued by resilient dilemmas. Just look at time-honored controversies about
human development that recur time and again, alas in different disguises, throughout history.
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Take, for example, the famous “nature versus nurture” dilemma, “mind and body” problem or
the controversy about the “transfer of learning.” All these quandaries have an appearance of
disagreements about empirical facts, but may, in reality, be a matter of lexical ambiguities. The
blurriness of the vocabulary is the most obvious explanation for our inability to overcome the
differences and build on each other’s work: Unknown to ourselves, we are likely to be using the
same words – nature, nurture, mind, transfer – in different ways. Similarly, our inability to capture
the complexity of human phenomena may well be a matter of an inadequacy of our analytic
methods, the weakness that, in the absence of explicit, operational definitions, seems incurable.
At a closer look, the lack of operationality is only the beginning of the researcher’s
problem. Without clear definitions, one is left at the mercy of metaphors, that is, of concepts
created by transferring familiar words into unfamiliar territories. Indeed, if we are able to use
words such as nurture or transfer in the context of human learning and development, it is
because both these terms are known to us from everyday discourse. The services rendered by
metaphors, however, are not without a price: together with the unwritten guidelines for how
to incorporate the old term into new contexts come hordes of unforeseen metaphorical
entailments, some of which may interfere with the task of gaining useful insights into the
observed phenomena. Whereas the use of metaphor cannot be barred – after all, this is one
of the principal mechanisms of discourse building – the risks of metaphorical projections
may be considerably reduced by providing the metaphorically engendered notions with
operational definitions.
Being explicit and operational about one’s own use of word, however, is not an easy
matter. Some people circumvent the challenge by turning to numbers. Precise measurement
seems such an obvious antidote to the uncertainties of descriptive narratives! Rather than merely
describing what the child does when grappling with mathematical problems, those who speak
“numerese” would look at students’ solutions, divide them in categories and check distributions.
Rather than scrutinizing the utterances of a girl executing an arithmetic operations they would
measure her IQ, consider her grades and decide whether the numbers justify labeling her as
“learning disabled.” Never mind the fact that in the quantitative discourse the numbers may be
originating in categorizations as under-defined as those that belong to its “qualitative”
counterpart (after all, there is no reason to assume that the words signifying things to be
counted, when not defined in operational terms, are more operational than any other.) Forget the
fact that in their zeal to bring simplicity, order and unification, the quantitatively minded
interlocutors are likely to gloss over potentially significant individual differences. It is only too
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tempting to believe that numbers can say it all and that when they speak, there is no need to
worry about words.
I do worry about words, though, and this book is the result of this concern. In spite of
my liking for numbers – after all, I am the native of mathematics – I am acutely aware of the
perils of the purely numerical talk. The uneasy option of operationalizing the discourse about
uniquely human forms of life seem the only alternative. On the following pages, I take a close
look at the basics terms such as thinking, learning and communication and try to define them with the
help of clear, publicly accessible criteria. If this operationalizing effort raises some brows – if
somebody protests saying that thinking and communication are natural phenomena and thus not
anything that people should bother to define – let me remind that defining regards the ways we
talk about the world, not the world as such, and it is up to us, not to the nature, to decide how to
match our words with phenomena. And to the readers who feel that I try to tell them how to
talk let me explain that this, too, is not the case. All I want is to be understood the way I
intended, on my own terms. For me, being explicit about my use of words is simply a matter of
“conceptual accountability,” of being committed to, and responsible for, effectiveness of my
communication with others.
The conceptualization I am about to propose may be regarded as an almost selfimposing entailment of what was explicitly said by Vygotsky and what was implied by
Wittgenstein. The point of departure is Vygotsky’s claim that historically established, collectively
implemented activities are developmentally prior to all our uniquely human skills. Being one of
these skills, human thinking must also have a collective predecessor. Obviously, interpersonal
communication is the only candidate. In this book, therefore, thinking is defined as the
individualized version of interpersonal communication – as a communicative interaction in which one
person plays the roles of all interlocutors. The term commognition, a combination of communication
and cognition comes to stress that inter-personal communication and individual thinking are two
varieties of the same phenomenon.
In the nine chapters of this book, the introduction to the commognitive perspective is
accompanied by a careful examination of its theoretical consequences and of its implications for
research and for educational practice. The task is implemented in two steps. Part I (chapters 1
through 4) is devoted to the double project of telling a story of human thinking and creating a
language in which this story may usefully be told. After presenting a number of time-honored
controversies regarding human learning and problem solving (Chapter 1), and after tracing the
roots of these quandaries to certain linguistic ambiguities (Chapter 2), the commognitive vision is
introduced as a possible cure for at least some of the persistent dilemmas and uncertainties
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(Chapter 3). Although it is repeatedly stressed that language is not the only medium in which
communication may take place, it is now claimed that verbal communication may well be the
primary source of the distinctively human forms of life (Chapter 4.) Indeed, if one was to name a
single feature that would set human kind apart from all the others in the eyes of a hypothetical
extraterrestrial observer, the most likely choice would be our ability to accumulate complexity of
action, that is, the fact that our forms of life, unlike those of other species, evolve and grow in
intricacy and sophistication from one generation to another, constantly redefining the nature and
range of individual development. It may now be argued that this gradual growth is made possible
by the fact that our activities are verbally mediated. More specifically, thanks to the special
property of human language known as recursivity, the activity-mediating discourses, and the
resulting texts, become the primary repository of the gradually increasing complexity.
Consistently with this vision, research on human development becomes the study of the growth
of discourses.
In Part II I return to the questions that started me on this project: I use the
commognitive lens to make sense of one special type of discourse called mathematical. By
choosing mathematics I hope to be able to illustrate the power of commognitive framework with
a particular clarity. Mathematical thinking has been psychologists' favorite object of study ever
since the advent of the disciplined inquiry into human cognition. Widely regarded as perhaps the
most striking instantiation of the human capacity for abstraction and complexity, mathematics is
also a paragon of rigor and clarity: It is decomposable into relatively neatly delineated,
hierarchically organized layers that allow for many different levels of engagement and
performance. The tradition of using mathematics as a medium within which to address general
questions about human thinking goes back to Jean Piaget,5 and continues with the wide variety
of developmental psychologists and misconceptions seekers, ending up, at least for now, with
the sociocultural thinkers who vowed to reclaim the place of the social within the time honored
trinity world-society-individual.6 Throughout history, students of human mind were often divided
on questions of epistemology, methodology and of the meaning of observed phenomena, but
they always agreed that mathematical thinking is a perfect setting for uncovering general truths
about human development7.
In the four chapters devoted to mathematical thinking, I develop the commognitive
vision of mathematics as a type of discourse – as a well-defined form of communication, made
distinct by its vocabulary, visual mediators, routines and the narratives it produces (Chapter 5).
The questions of the nature and origins of the objects of mathematical discourse is then
addressed, and the claim is made that mathematics is an autopoietic discourse – one that spurs its
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own development and produces its own objects (Chapter 6). I follow with the questions of the
uniquely mathematical ways of communicating (Chapter 7) and of the goals and gains of
communicating in these special ways (Chapter 8). All along, particular attention is given to the
question of how mathematical discourse comes into being and how and why it subsequently
evolves. The vision of mathematics as a discourse, and thus as a form of human activity, makes it
possible to identify mechanisms that are common to the historical development of mathematics
and to its individual learning. Having stated all this, I return to the initial quandaries and ask
myself whether the commognitive vision brought the wished-for resolution. At the same time, I
wonder about a series of new puzzles, some of them already being taken care of and some others
still waiting to be transformed into researcheable questions (Chapter 9.)
All along the book, theoretical musings are interspersed with numerous empirical
instantiations. Although the examples are mostly mathematical, they are rather elementary and
easily accessible to anybody who knows a thing or two about the basic arithmetic. The
mathematical slant, therefore, should not deter non-mathematical readers, not even those who
suffer from mathematical anxiety. It is also worth mentioning that the book may be read in
different ways, depending on one’s needs and foci. Those interested mainly in theorizing about
human thinking may satisfy themselves with Part I, where references to mathematics are scarce.
Those who reach for this book because of their interest in mathematical thinking, can head
directly toward Part II. The glossary in the end of the volume will help them, if necessary, with
concise explanations of basic terms and tenets.
******
Once we agree that thinking is an individualized form of interpersonal communication, we must
also concede that whatever one creates is a product of collective doing. Even when sitting alone
at her desk and deeply immersed in thoughts, a person is engaged in a conversation with others.
Like any human artifact, this book is thus full of “echoes and reverberations” of conversations
that took place at different times and places, involving people whom I never met, and probably
many others of whom I haven’t even heard. Being “filled with others' words”8 this text has
therefore more contributors than I am aware of. While echoing other peoples’ words or when
taking exception with what they said I dragged them into this conversation, sometimes
intentionally and sometimes unconsciously. If their roles were revealed, not all of these
involuntary contributors would agree to take any credit for the final product. Nevertheless, I
would dearly like to acknowledge them all. Unfortunately, I can express my gratitude only to
those few people of whose contribution I am aware, hoping to be forgiven by all the others.
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Let me begin, therefore, with Lev Vygotsky and Ludwig Wittgenstein, two giants whose
shoulders proved wide enough to accommodate legions of followers and a wide variety of
interpreters. Although libraries have already been filled with exegetic treatises, the Byelorussian
psychologist and the Austrian-born philosopher continue to inspire new ideas even as I am
writing these lines. This, it seems, is due to one important feature their writings have in common:
rather than provide information, the two authors address the reader as a partner in thinking;
rather than presenting a completed edifice with all the scaffolding removed, they extend an
invitation for a guided tour of the construction site; rather than imposing firm convictions, they
share the “doubt that comes after belief.”9 These two writers had a major impact on my thinking;
I can only hope they had a similar effect on my ability to share it.
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